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The incidence of nonbusiness bankruptcy has risen significantly
since the Second World War, and in the past decade a new variety
of consumer bankrupt has emerged - the student who petitions
for a discharge of federally guaranteed student loans.' These de-
velopments have raised the question whether the "fresh start"
policy embodied in the national bankruptcy act I prohibits cred-
itors or third parties from coercing bankrupts to repay discharged
debts. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in a 1971 de-
cision, Perez v. Campbell,' and struck down a provision of the
Arizona motorists' financial responsibility law because it afforded
creditors "a powerful weapon with which to force bankrupts to
pay their debts despite their discharge." 4 In Girardier v. Webster
College,5 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded
that Perez and the bankruptcy act prohibited only coercion
through governmental action and did not encompass the informal
debt-collection tactics of private creditors. The court therefore
held that a private college may refuse to release transcripts to
1 The number of personal bankruptcies increased from 8,566 in 1946 to 211,348
in 1976. V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 263
(2d ed. 1974) (1976 statistic on file with author). See REPORT OF TIrE COM-
MISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-
X37, PT. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (I973); D. STANLEY & M. GIaRTH, BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM i8-20 (I97I).
Student bankruptcy claims paid by the federal government and other guarantee
agencies rose from 943 (totalling $i.o million) in 1971, to 4,559 (totalling $6.8
million) in 1975. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32 Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 9 4 th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 1076-77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Judiciary
Hearings].
2 ii U.S.C. §§ i-iio3 (1976). The Supreme Court has explained that one of
the primary objectives of the act is to provide the debtor with "a new opportunity
in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and dis-
couragement of preexisting debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934).
34o2 U.S. 637 (I971).
4 Id. at 654. The Court invalidated under the supremacy clause a provision
of the statute that suspended the driver's license and automobile registration of
an individual who failed to satisfy a motor vehicle tort judgment, even though
this liability had been discharged in bankruptcy.
'563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. x977).
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former students who had obtained discharges in bankruptcy of
their National Defense Education Act (NDEA) loans.
In Girardier, the two plaintiffs had procured NDEA loans
from Webster College, a private educational institution in Mis-
souri. After receiving their bachelor's degrees they filed petitions
in bankruptcy and were discharged from repayment of their
student loans. They subsequently applied for transcripts of their
undergraduate credits, tendering the required two-dollar fee, but
the college refused to furnish the transcripts on the ground that
the plaintiffs had failed to repay their educational debts.' The
plaintiffs sued for injunctive and monetary relief,7 claiming that
the defendant had violated their rights under the federal bank-
ruptcy act.' The district court dismissed the suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 9 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit re-
manded the action with instructions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim on which relief could be granted."0
Judge Urbom, writing for the majority, began his opinion
by noting that prior to 1970 the courts had sanctioned the im-
position of various hardships on bankrupts that induced the
repayment or reaffirmation 1" of discharged debts.' 2  He ac-
'Id. at 1269. The college conceded that if the plaintiffs paid their obligations,
the transcripts would be furnished. Id.
' The Girardier complaint sought damages only, while the Luzkow complaint
requested declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Id.
'Id. at 1270. The plaintiffs had also sought relief under the "Buckley-Pell
Amendment," 20 U.S.C. § I232g (1976), which authorizes students to inspect and
review their educational records. However, the court held that the amendment
did not create a private right of action since § 1232g(f) placed enforcement
exclusively in the hands of the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. 563 F.2d at 1276-77.
9 421 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
10563 F.2d at 1277. The court of appeals found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 133i(a) (i97o), pointing out that the plaintiffs alleged a violation of rights
afforded them by a federal act, and then proceeded to the merits. 563 F.2d at 1270.
Chief District Judge Urbom, sitting by designation, wrote the majority opinion,
which was joined by Judge Ross. Judge Bright filed a concurring opinion.
" The common law reaffirmation theory followed in many jurisdictions
postulates that a moral obligation to pay a debt survives a discharge and permits
a state to grant recovery to a creditor on the basis of a new promise, even though
this promise is not supported by new consideration. See Zavelo v. Reeves, 227
U.S. 625, 629 (X913) ("[Tlhe discharge destroys the remedy but not the in-
debtedness."). See generally IA COLLiER ON BANxRUPTCY f[f 17.33-38 (14th ed.
J. Moore 1978); Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to Pay His Dis-
charged Debts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47
hIm. L.J. 36 (,971).
12 Judge Urbom referred primarily to the Supreme Court decisions of Reitz v.
Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (194x), and Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S.
X53 (1962), which upheld New York and Utah financial responsibility laws that
suspended the driver's license and automobile registration of an individual who
had not paid a motor vehicle tort judgment even though this debt had been
1978]
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knowledged that the 197o amendments to the bankruptcy act 13
and Perez had expanded the protection of bankrupts against
creditor harassment, but distinguished these developments as
inapplicable to the facts of Girardier. According to Judge Urbom,
the 197o amendments precluded only the initiation by creditors
of legal proceedings in state courts and did not extend to in-
formal methods of collecting or reviving discharged debts. In
his view, pending legislative proposals to prohibit both the dis-
criminatory treatment of bankrupts and the reaffirmation of
discharged debts 14 confirmed that the present bankruptcy law
did not fully implement a "fresh start" policyY5 Judge Urbom
also observed that Perez and subsequent cases had gone no
further than to proscribe certain forms of governmental penaliza-
tion of bankrupts. 6 Drawing a distinction between state and
discharged in bankruptcy. (These cases were virtually overruled by Perez, 402
U.S. at 652 (197').) He also pointed out that private creditors were permitted
great latitude in their efforts to revive discharged debts. 563 F.2d at X270-72.
13 1 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (976) enjoined creditors from "instituting or con-
tinuing any action or employing any process to collect such debts as personal
liabilities of the bankrupt." Prior to I97o, a debtor who had obtained a general
discharge from a bankruptcy court could be sued on a debt in a state court and
was required to plead the bankruptcy discharge as an affirmative defense. Even
when the defense was properly pleaded, the creditor could thereafter assert that
his debt was included in one of the statutory exceptions to discharge. Thus the
effect of the general discharge on any given debt was ultimately decided by a
state court. This "dual court" procedure often produced default judgments for
creditors; bankrupts failed to contest state court suits either because of improper
service, inadequate financial resources, or a naive reliance on the general dis-
charge. Section 3 2(f)(2) of the 197o amendments abolished this bifurcated
system in an attempt to "effectuate more fully the discharge in bankruptcy by
rendering it less subject to abuse by harassing creditors." S. REP. No. 91-ii73,
gist Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); H. RF'. No. 91-1502, 9ist Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4156, 4156. See generally
Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 Am. BANx. L.J. 1, 2-21 (1971);
Note, Bankruptcy-197o Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act-An Attempt to
Remedy Discharge Abuses, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 1347, 1352-55 (197I); Comment,
Section x4f(2) of the Bankruptcy Act: Half a Loaf to the Bankrupt, 14 Hous. L.
REv. 486, 489-93 (i977); Comment, Bankruptcy: Effect of the z97o Bankruptcy
Act Amendments on the Discharge That Never Was, I97I Wis. L. REv. x174,
lx75-77.
"
4 Two revised bankruptcy proposals were drafted, one by the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); S. 236, 9 4 th Cong., ist Sess. (1975), and the other by the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, H.R. 32, 9 4 th Cong., 2d Sess. (976); S. 235,
9 4 th Cong., ist Sess. (i975). See Judiciary Hearings, supra note x; The
Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 & S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 4 th
Cong., xst Sess. (1975). For subsequent developments, see note 45 infra.
15563 F.2d at 1272-73, 1276.
"
6 Id. at 1273-74; see, e.g., Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277
(W)D. La. I975) (police department rule subjecting employee to dismissal for
[VOL. 91:13361338
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private action, he concluded that the courts could not restrict
the use by private creditors of "nonlegal, informal means of
inducing the debtor to make payment on or revive the discharged
obligation." 11
Judge Bright concurred in the result but disagreed with the
rationale offered by the court. He rejected the distinction be-
tween state and private action in the bankruptcy context, observ-
ing that the majority's analysis would produce a contrary result
if the creditor were a public rather than a private college. 8 In
his view, this dichotomy was not mandated by Perez, and the
sole issue was whether the defendant had violated the "fresh
start" principle. According to Judge Bright, since the plaintiffs
retained a "fund of knowledge of lifelong value" '" and suffered
only the "loss of an additional benefit," 20 -the action of the
college in withholding the transcript did not contravene the
bankruptcy act.2 '
The arguments of the Girardier majority that the bankruptcy
statute does not reach the coercive postdischarge actions of
private creditors are unpersuasive. Admittedly, the 197o amend-
ments were directed only at subsequent legal proceedings in-
stituted by a creditor and did not affect the reaffirmation of
discharged debts.22 But the fact that Congress did not void
filing bankruptcy petition); Grimes v. Hoschler, 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65,
IiS Cal. Rptr. 625 (I974) (en banc) (statute permitting revocation of bankrupt con-
tractor's license), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); In re Loftin, 327 So. 2d
543 (La. Ct. App.) (en banc) (fire department rule that declaration of bank-
ruptcy warrants automatic dismissal), appeal denied, 331 So. 2d 851 (1976); cf.
Marshall v. District of Columbia Gov't, 559 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Perez
does not prevent police department from taking bankruptcy into account in
evaluating an applicant's fitness for employment); House v. O'Grady, 35 Ohio
Misc. 20, 299 N.E.2d 7o6 (C.P. 1973) (Perez does not preclude requirement of
proof of future financial responsibility to regain driver's license).
" 563 F.2d at 1272. The court found support for the state action-private
action distinction in a footnote in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,
545 F.2d 99, 93o n.57 (5th Cir. I977) (en banc). The McLellan court concluded
that the bankruptcy act did not prohibit the defendant, a private utility company,
from discharging an employee who filed a bankruptcy petition. Id. at 929-30.
See also Note, Supremacy of the Bankruptcy Act: The New Standard of Perez v.
Campbell, 40 GEO. WAsir. L. REv. 764, 772 (1972).
18563 F.2d at 1277; see Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 455 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J.
1978) (public university permanently enjoined from withholding transcripts and
denying registration to a former student whose educational loans had been dis-
charged in bankruptcy).
20 563 F.2d at 1277.
2 0 Id. at 1278 n.io.
21 Id. at 1278.
22 Commentators and judges are in agreement that the phrase "or employing
any process" in iI U.S.C. § 32(f) (2) (1976), see note 13 supra, refers exclusively
to legal process such as the use of garnishment or attachment writs. See, e.g.,
1978] 1339
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reaffirmations does not address the permissibility of coercive
means of inducing them.2" Indeed, the arguments advanced for
retaining the reaffirmation doctrine emphasize the willingness of
bankrupts to revive discharged debts in order to further their
own interests.24 Thus congressional silence on the reaffirmation
issue does not imply that the courts are precluded from policing
the methods by which creditors seek to obtain the repayment or
reaffirmation of debts discharged in bankruptcy."
In fact, the Supreme Court in Perez resolved the very ques-
tion of creditor coercion when it interpreted the bankruptcy
statute to prohibit postdischarge actions that made "it more
probable that the debt will be paid despite the discharge." 2
Although Perez involved a state law, the Court appealed broadly
to the "fresh start" policy 2 7 and considered that policy sufficiently
important to override federalism and comity concerns and to
warrant the invalidation of a state statute that promoted an
otherwise laudable public objective.2" There is no indication in
Wood v. Fiedler, 548 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1977); In re Thompson, 416 F.
Supp. 99z, 994-96 (S.D. Tex. 1976); iA COLLIER oxr BANKRUPTCY, supra note ii,
II 14.69. Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the i97o
amendments clearly states that the proposed legislation "does not affect in any
way a bankrupt's obligation upon a discharged debt which is subsequently revived
by a new promise." ii6 CONG. REc. 34,818, 34,819 (1970).
23 This distinction between reaffirmation or repayment and the coercive methods
employed to obtain them is reflected in § I44.32 of the HEW Proposed Rules
for the National Direct Student Loan Program, which states that "[ain institution
shall refrain from collection activity with respect to a loan in the event the
borrower is adjudicated a bankrupt." However, any payment "shall revive the
borrower's obligation for repayment of his loan." 4o Fed. Reg. 48,252, 48,262
(I975). See also 20 U.S.C. § 424 (1976); id. § xo87cc.24 See note 42 infra.
25 Indeed, certain authorities have contended that the 197o amendments do
not preclude the judiciary from completely invalidating reaffirmations. They have
noted that the reaffirmation doctrine has never been seriously challenged in the
federal courts, and have suggested that state common law doctrines should be
subjected to the same scrutiny that Perez applied to a state statute. See Boshkoff,
supra note ii, at 6o-69; Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases
(pt. 2), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 670-7, (972).
26 402 U.S. at 650 (quoting Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153,
173 (1962)).
27 Id. at 648.
28 These considerations suggest that the federal "fresh start" policy extends
as liberally to private creditor actions as it does to state legislation. When a state
law is invalidated under the supremacy clause, state-federal comity concerns are
implicated and a presumption of legislative constitutionality must be overcome.
In contrast, the policing of private creditor actions presents no issues of federalism
or constitutionality, but merely the direct application of federal law to private
conduct in an area where Congress has undoubted regulatory power. In addition,
the Supreme Court in Perez interpreted the bankruptcy act to require the
abrogation of any state law that frustrates the "fresh start" policy, no matter how
[Vol. 91 :13361340
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Perez that federal objectives can be frustrated only by state
legislatures, and the majority in Girardier offered no sound reason
for restricting the application of the "fresh start" policy to
cases of "state action." Bankruptcy is a highly developed federal
statutory scheme based on an explicit and comprehensive grant
of constitutional power.29 The very function of the national
bankruptcy act is to regulate private relations between debtor
and creditor. Thus, there is no justification for introducing a
state action limitation on the power of the courts to protect the
efficacy of the discharge when in the predischarge context such
a distinction is wholly untenable.
Although Girardier did not refer specifically to the fourteenth
amendment, the court's advocacy of a "state action" require-
ment seems to reflect an inappropriate engrafting of a distinction
drawn from fourteenth amendment analysis onto the federal
bankruptcy law. The fact that the rationale of the Girardier
majority would lead to a different result if the educational in-
stitution were public rather than private is not as troublesome
as Judge Bright assumed,30 for that anomaly is a pervasive
characteristic of our legal system.3' Rather, what is particularly
disquieting in Girardier is the court's reflexive extension of the
dichotomy between state and private action into an area where
well intentioned or beneficial that law may be in other respects. If an otherwise
commendable and legitimate exercise of the police power is insufficient to over-
ride the "fresh start" principle, it would seem that the economic interest of a
private party would be equally inadequate.
29 The constitutional provision states that Congress shall have the power to
establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Unlike the commerce provision of clause 3,
which has developed into a sweeping grant of federal legislative power despite its
formal limitation to "interstate" commerce, see, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964) ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 1oo (I94i), the bankruptcy clause
contains no inherent federalism constraint that might suggest the propriety of a
narrow construction of legislation promulgated under its authority.
0563 F.2d at 1277.
"1 Owing to the fourteenth amendment "state action" requirement, students
in public educational institutions are granted constitutional protections un-
available to students in private schools, and attempts to characterize private
institutions as "state action" because of public funding, tax exemptions, and
grant programs have proved largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Hendrickson, "State
Action" and Private Higher Education, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 53 (1973); Note, Contract
Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. LJ. 253 (1973); Note,
Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action
Principle, 84 YAL.z L.J. 120 (i974). See generally Black, The Supreme Court,
x966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition z4, 8i HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Note, State Action: Theories for




neither the constitutional provision, the statute, nor the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court support any limitation of federal
authority to instances of "state action."
The Girardier court also insisted that pending legislative re-
forms in the areas of debt reaffirmation and discrimination against
bankrupts mandated a strict construction of the bankruptcy act.
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently stated that the
"various provisions of the bankruptcy act were adopted in the
light of [the 'fresh start' policy] and are to be construed when
reasonably possible in harmony with it so as to effectuate the
general purpose and policy of the act." 32 Moreover, Perez and
its progeny, in proscribing certain forms of postdischarge harass-
ment, have already elaborated the bare statutory language.
The implicit premise in Perez was that Congress intended to
implement a more broadly efficacious "fresh start" policy than
a narrow reading of the statute and the I97o amendments might
suggest, and that therefore the Court could attack the problem
of coerced repayments in the absence of a specific statutory
mandate." Subsequent lower court cases have gone even further
than Perez in addressing, without explicit legislative sanction
and in the face of related Congressional deliberations, the larger
issue of discriminatory treatment of bankrupts.3 4 In addition,
bankruptcy judges have recognized the statute's application to
postdischarge actions by claiming jurisdiction over private cred-
itor reaffirmation agreements. 3' Thus many courts, including
the Supreme Court, have rejected the Girardier notion that
impending legislative reform requires a constricted interpretation
of the language of the bankruptcy act rather than adherence to its
broader principles and purposes.
For these reasons, Girardier does not convincingly demon-
strate that actions by private creditors are beyond the scope of
"Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (I934). Accord, Lines v.
Frederick, 4oo U.S. 18, I9-2o (i97o) (per curiam) ; Harris v. Zion's Sav. Bank &
Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 6o5, 617
(1918); Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55
(19,5).
" Indeed, the comment to one of the revised bankruptcy acts acknowledged
that Perez had anticipated explicit statutory authorization by stating that one
of the sections was intended to "codif[y] the principle in Perez." REPORT OF THE
ComamsSIoN oN THE BANxea~uicy LAWS OF = UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, PT. 11, 93d Cong., ist Sess. 144 (i973).
"'See, e.g., Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277, 128o-8x
(W.D. La. 1975); In re Loftin, 327 So. 2d 543, 546-47 (La. Ct. App.) (en bane),
appeal denied, 331 So. 2d 851 (1976). Presumably the regulations struck
down in these cases fulfilled a deterrent or punitive rather than a compliance
function. The fact situation in Girardier apparently represents an attempt both
to coerce repayment and to deter prospective defaulters.
" See Judiciary Hearings, supra note x, at 921 (statement of Linn K. Twinem).
[Vol. 91 :13361342
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judicial examination. On the contrary, implementation of the
broader purposes of the bankruptcy act requires that private
actions, as well as state laws, be scrutinized for violations of the
"fresh start" principle.36 Any coercive act imposing such hard-
ship on a bankrupt as to create a likelihood that the debt will
be repaid despite the discharge must be considered a violation
of the bankruptcy statute, since the very purpose of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding is to free an individual from "the pressure
and discouragement of preexisting debt." 37 The factual situation
in Girardier indicates that certain private creditors are in a
position to exert the same coercive effect on the bankrupt as did
the state law in Perez. The refusal to release a transcript is the
functional equivalent of the revocation of a state license in terms
of its efficacy in securing repayment of a discharged debt and
thus is equally violative of the federal "fresh start" policy.
The coercive power of the creditor in Girardier derived from
three critical factors also present in Perez. First, the bankrupt
seriously needed the certificate that was withheld by the cred-
itor.3 A transcript, like a state license or other form of official
documentation, is frequently a prerequisite to utilizing the train-
ing and expertise to which it attests. Despite the insistence of
the Girardier concurrence that the "lifelong value" of an educa-
tion remains with the student, its practical utility is frequently
contingent on its certification 3 9-just as the "lifelong value"
of knowing how to drive is useless without a driver's license.
Access to a college transcript acquires added significance in a
period when undergraduate study is increasingly viewed as a
preliminary to professional training, and the transcript is a re-
quirement for admission to most graduate programs.40  Because
of the certification function of the transcript, the situation of
3 Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (I957) (federal
rights of private parties inferred from general federal labor policy).
"' Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (I934).
38563 F.2d at 1269; Brief for Appellant at 28; see Handsome v. Rutgers
Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362 (DN.J. 1978).
" The courts have recognized the importance of educational documents in
compelling their release in other situations. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v.
Lincoln Medical College, 8x Neb. 533, ii6 N.W. 294 (1908) (institution com-
pelled to issue diploma); People ex rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law School, 75
N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1i8, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893) (school required to release certificate
of attendance and satisfactory passing of examinations); Strank v. Mercy Hos-
pital, 383 Pa. 54, 117 A.2d 697 (1955) (equity court has jurisdiction to compel
college to issue certificate of student's credits).
4 This is evident from the facts of Girardier. Plaintiff Luzkow alleged that
she required her transcript in order to complete applications to graduate school;
Girardier claimed that he needed his undergraduate transcript to obtain a master's
degree, to which he was otherwise entitled, from the University of Missouri-St.
Louis. 563 F.2d at 1269.
1978] 1343
the student in Girardier can be easily distinguished from that of
the typical consumer bankrupt.
Second, the debtor could obtain the necessary documentation
only from the creditor. The college in Girardier, like a state
licensing agency, possessed monopoly power over the required
certificate. There existed no acceptable substitute for the tran-
script and no means of obtaining access to it apart from an
appeal to the college itself. It is improbable that an ordinary
commercial creditor has this degree of monopoly control.
Third, the college, like the creditor who might have benefited
from the state law struck down in Perez, puts nothing new at
risk in releasing the official document to the bankrupt. The position
of Webster College was quite distinct from that of the usual
commercial creditor, and hence Girardier's invocation of the
reaffirmation analogy was inappropriate. Bankrupts generally
revive commercial debts in order to retain the collateral that
secured the loan or to procure further credit,4' and the creditor
therefore incurs some degree of additional risk - either the
loss of his collateral or default on the further loan.4 2 Even con-
ceding the inequality of bargaining power and the minimal worth
of the collateral in many cases, some quantum of creditor risk
is present when a debtor reaffirms the usual commercial debt. A
college, by contrast, incurs no added risk of any kind in furnish-
ing a transcript in exchange for reaffirmation or repayment; in-
deed, like the creditor in Perez, it suffers no additional risk even
when the document is released merely for the required fee. This
complete absence of any potential creditor harm further under-
mines the legitimacy of the action of the college in Girardier.
Girardier thus illustrates that certain private creditors enjoy
substantial advantages in seeking repayment of discharged debts
and can exert pressures on a bankrupt that effectively vitiate the
41 These are the major reasons for reviving discharged debts, though bankrupts
may also reaffirm to protect a co-obligor from liability or to honor a moral obliga-
tion. See sources cited note 42 infra.
42 Proponents of the reaffirmation doctrine contend that bankrupts themselves
value the right to reaffirm and that voiding such promises would deprive them
of the opportunity to strike economically advantageous bargains. See, e.g.,
Judiciary Hearings, supra note i, at 925, 1049-53; Comment, Reaffirmation of
Debts Discharged in Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study of an Area of Potential
FTC Regulation, 8 CowN. L. Rav. SX9 (1976). The contrary argument is that
bankrupts are easily victimized by overreaching creditors and often find them-
selves burdened with impossible obligations after reaffirmation; moreover, voiding
reaffirmations would only render the promise unenforceable and would not
prohibit a bankrupt from repaying a discharged debt if he so wished. See, e.g.,
REPORT OF THE ComzsIoN ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OP THE UNITED STATEs,
H.R. Doc. No. X37, PT. I, 93d Cong., ist Sess. 33, 177 (1973); Bloshkoff, supra
note ii; Countryman, supra note 25. Whatever the proper resolution of the
reaffirmation controversy, it is irrelevant to the creditor coercion in Girardier.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol, 91 :13361344
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discharge. Any creditor who has exclusive control over a neces-
sary form of certification, and who would incur no additional
risk in releasing the document to the bankrupt, possesses "a
powerful weapon for collection of a debt from which [the]
bankrupt [has] been released by federal law." 43 As this was the
position of the creditor in Girardier, the refusal to release a
transcript, like the suspension of a state license in Perez, con-
stitutes a clear violation of the "fresh start" policy.
A recent legislative restriction on the availability of student
bankruptcy relief will diminish the number of discharges of educa-
tional loans, 44 but transcripts are not the only form of private
documentation that creditors may attempt to withhold in order
to secure repayment. Certain private records of physicians, at-
torneys and employers might also be used in this fashion. The
three enumerated criteria -necessity, monopoly power, and ab-
sence of new risk--can thus be generally applied to identify
private creditor behavior that significantly and needlessly frus-
trates the objectives of federal policy.
Congress is currently considering a broad and comprehensive
revision of the bankruptcy act that would explicitly protect
bankrupts against all creditor attempts to collect a discharged
debt.4 5 But the majority in Girardier incorrectly concluded that
43 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 650 (1971) (quoting the dissent in Kesler
v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 183 (1962) (opinion of Black, J.)).
44 A recent amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965 prohibits students
from discharging educational debts in bankruptcy until five years after the date
of commencement of the repayment period of the loan, unless the bankruptcy
court determines that failure to discharge the debt would "impose an undue hard-
ship on the debtor or his dependents." 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (976). H.R. 820o,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), incorporates a provision that will continue the
restriction contained in the Education Act. 124 CONG. REc. H472 (daily ed.
Feb. i, 1978). This measure should allay the fears of colleges that student
borrowers will avoid repayment by declaring bankruptcy immediately after
graduation when their liabilities will almost invariably exceed their assets. The
current limitation on the availability of bankruptcy relief will not totally eliminate
discharges of student loans; such discharges will continue to occur in cases of
"hardship" and when an educational debt has not been completely repaid during
the five year period. But since colleges are now protected against exploitation
of their loan programs, adoption of the Girardier position in future cases would
be unnecessary as well as wholly inequitable.
4The House has recently passed H.R. 82oo, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.
REc. H478 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978), which voids reaffirmations in § 524(b) and
addresses the question of creditor harassment in § 524(a)(2): a discharge
"operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of any
action, the employment of any process, or any act, to collect, recover, or offset
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor." The additional language
"or any act" presumably refers to informal creditor tactics aimed at collecting
discharged debts, and may well reflect a legislative response to cases such as
McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., S45 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
banc), and In re Thompson, 416 F. Supp. ggi (S.D. Tex. 1976). Section 525
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the existing statute does not confer authority on the judiciary to
proscribe private creditor actions that contravene the "fresh
start" principle. Whether by legislative enactment or by appro-
priate judicial construction, bankrupts can and should be pro-
tected against private creditor coercion that violates the intent
and the spirit of the bankruptcy act.
of the House bill prohibits governmental discrimination with respect to licenses
and employment -arguably a validation of certain of the post-Perez cases.
A bill with substantially similar provisions is pending before the Senate. S. 2266,
95th Cong., ist Sess. §§ 524(a) (2), 525 (1977). The major distinction is that
the Senate version permits revived debts to be enforced after a thirty-day "cooling
off" period, id. § 524(b).
